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   3
“the so-called twin-deficits hypothesis, that government budget deficits cause current 
account deficits, does not account for the fact that the U.S. external deficit expanded by 
about $300 billion between 1996 and 2000, a period during which the federal budget 
was in surplus and projected to remain so. Nor, for that matter, does the twin-deficits 
hypothesis shed any light on why a number of major countries, including Germany and 
Japan, continue to run large current account surpluses despite government budget 
deficits that are similar in size (as a share of GDP) to that of the United States.” 
Bernanke (2005). 
 
“A smaller federal budget deficit would mean more national saving, less reliance on 
foreign capital flows, and a smaller trade deficit. The trade deficit and the budget deficit 
are not twins, but they are cousins.” Mankiw (2006). 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years the resurgence of current account imbalances in the US and the 
existence of very large double-digit current account deficits, for instance, in the new EU 
Member States, contributed to rekindle the issue of the linkages between government 
budget and external deficits. The argument that a government budget deficit leads to a 
current account deficit, results from the fact that budget deficits tend to increase the 
domestic interest rate. The higher interest rate attracts foreign capital, inducing an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, which in turn leads to an increase in the current 
account deficit. Such an effect can be more relevant the higher the economy’s degree of 
openness. Furthermore, the twin-deficits idea is closely linked to the argument that if 
saving and investment are not correlated then the budget deficit and the current account 
deficit would tend to move jointly. In other words, private saving may not increase 
sufficiently to offset the effects of increased budget deficits. This point recalls the 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) puzzle regarding the degree of international capital 
mobility, with cross-country saving-investment correlations proposed as a measure of 
international capital mobility.  
The existence of a relationship between a country’s government budgetary 
position and its current account balance naturally needs to be assessed empirically. 
While several studies have analysed the existence of convergence (or divergence)   4
between the current account and budgetary imbalances on a country basis, only a few 
studies have taken advantage of the panel econometrics framework. Indeed, in the 
empirical literature, unit root or cointegration tests have in the past been mostly 
performed for individual countries posing the problem of relatively short time series. 
However, panel data methods have recently been used, for instance, to assess fiscal 
sustainability, notably in the EU, taking advantage of the increased power that may be 
brought to the cointegration hypothesis through the increased number of observations 
that results from adding the individual time series (see, Afonso and Rault, 2007).  
Within the context of our study, and given the growing financial integration and 
mobility of capital between countries, a panel assessment is also relevant, particularly 
for a sample of EU and OECD countries. For instance, in the EU, the fiscal framework 
underpinning the Stability and Growth Pact has renewed attention to the effects of large 
sustained fiscal deficits on national savings, investment, interest rates, and the current 
account.
1 Therefore, in this paper we assess empirically the existence of a relation 
between the government budget balance and the current account balance, taking 
advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques and the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) methods, which, to the best of our knowledge, was not 
employed before in this context. We cover the period from 1970 to 2007 and we also 
define different country groupings for the set of OECD and EU countries. Moreover, a 
long-term relationship between budgetary and current balances and the real effective 
exchange rate is also investigated. 
It is also important to bear in mind that as in a country by country time series 
analysis, the performance of the estimation methods implemented in a panel framework 
depends largely on how well the underlying assumptions of those methods reflect the 
                                                 
1 Note that the fact that cross-country differences may exist does not prevent that cross-country 
dependencies may indeed exist, and that they play a role in the overall relationship between external en 
budgetary balances (apart from the gain of having a bigger panel sample).   5
properties of the data under analysis. More specifically, if data are stationary the 
conventional panel data techniques such as the well known within or random estimators 
or GMM estimation method can be carried out to assess the relationship between the 
budget balance and the current account balance. In contrast to stationary time series, if 
data are nonstationary as in our study, i. e. do not exhibit any clear-cut tendency to 
return to a constant value or a given trend, specific panel data cointegrating techniques 
are required because the conventional estimation methods are then not valid. Therefore, 
to determine the degree of integration of our series of interest (current account balances, 
budget balances and real effective exchange rates) we employ the bootstrap tests of 
Smith et al. (2004), which use a sieve sampling scheme to account for both the time 
series and cross-sectional dependencies of the data. 
In addition, we contribute to the literature by using the bootstrap 2
nd generation 
panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007), which allows 
accommodating both within and between the individual cross-sectional units. Such 
analysis has not been done to study the budgetary and external imbalances linkages. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two briefly reviews some 
theoretical underpinnings of the relations between government budget balances and 
current account balances, and the existing related evidence in the literature. Section 
three reports the results of the empirical analysis, which includes 2
nd generation panel 
unit root tests, panel cointegration and SUR analysis, while section four concludes. 
 
2. Some theoretical underpinnings and literature 
The conventional wisdom that government budget deficits play an important 
role in the determination of the current account, or that there is a causal link between 
large budgetary deficits and current account deficits, can be exemplified via looking at   6
national accounts aggregate identities.
2 The identity for GDP (Y) in an open economy 
can be written as  
  YCIGXM = ++ + −  (1) 
where C is private consumption expenditure, I is private investment, G is government 
expenditure,  X is exports of goods and services, M is imports of goods and services. On 
the other hand, private saving S is given by disposable income net of consumption 
expenditure, and taxes 
  SYCT = −− (2) 
where T is tax revenue. From (1) and (2) we can relate the current account balance, the 
net sale of goods to foreign agents, to the difference between national investment and 
national saving, which in turn is the sum of private and public saving. Thus, the current 
account balance is usually written as 
  () ( ) ( ) X MS I T G − =−+− (3) 
  () CA S I BUD = −+  (4) 
and it is evident to see that the current account (CA=X-M) balance is related to the 
budget balance (BUD=T-G) through the difference between private saving and 
investment. In other words, and as it is easily observed, the current account balance of a 
given country is by definition identical to the difference between national saving and 
domestic investment. Moreover, one also observes that the two main sources of saving; 
private domestic saving and foreign capital inflow (due to the current account deficit), 
finance the two main sources of demand for financial capital; private investment and the 
government budget deficit. 
When the government incurs a budget deficit (T-G<0) this may be financed in 
various ways. For instance, it may be financed by a private sector surplus (S>I), with 
                                                 
2 For instance, Roubini (1988) argues that the role of fiscal deficits in the determination of the current 
account and the saving behaviour can hardly be discarded.   7
the government issuing public debt and borrowing from the private sector. This 
financing strategy will be sustainable as long as the private sector is willing to buy 
government debt. Therefore, a government deficit need not imply a current account 
deficit. On the other hand, if a country runs a budget surplus and a widening current 
account deficit, this would reflect increases in private investment and/or declining 
private saving (implying S<I). 
Additionally, one could also envisage that under the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis consumers will perceive higher budget deficits today as postponed future 
higher taxes. Therefore, when the government reduces taxes, consumers just save more, 
to help pay the higher future taxes, which would leave consumption, investment and the 
current account balance unaffected.
3 On the other hand, in the absence of Ricardian 
equivalence a higher government budget balance rises national saving and increases the 
current account balance, while the effect of budget balances on the current account 
balances would also depend on the degree to which the private sector is liquidity 
constrained. 
When both the public and the private sectors are in a deficit position, then this 
will be reflected in a current account deficit (X-M<0). Such an overall shortfall in 
domestic saving may then be financed by foreign capital inflows, in the form of 
investments in either domestic public debt or the domestic private sector. This would 
imply a surplus position in the capital account (KA>0) and the accumulation of foreign 
reserves, R. 
  R CA KA = +  (5) 
                                                 
3 Ricardo (1817) first mentioned the equivalence idea, later popularised by Barro (1974), under which 
deficits might not affect the economy if consumers do not perceive government debt as wealth, and an 
increase in the budget deficit may then be offset by an increase in private saving.   8
On the other hand, if the capital account surplus is not sufficient to finance the 
current account deficit, foreign reserves may be directly used by the government to 
finance a fiscal deficit, or indirectly to finance a private sector deficit.  
Therefore, if the difference between private saving and investment remains 
stable, a budget deficit impinges negatively on the current account balance. Overall, this 
could imply that shocks to the fiscal position may push the current account balance in 
the same direction, the main point of the twin-deficits argument. However, investment 
and saving decisions are bound to change given the fiscal deficit, while the effect of 
fiscal policy on the current account should also depend on the size and the trade 
exposure of the country. Still evident from equation (4), is that with a given level of 
saving an increase in the budget deficit will either crowd out private investment or 
attract additional inflows of capital. 
In the context of a simple Fleming-Mundell open economy framework, one can 
recall that with international capital movements and flexible exchange rates,
4 a fiscal 
expansion could lead to higher interest rates, and in the presence of capital inflows an 
appreciation of the domestic currency may occur which could increase the current 
account deficit.
5 In theory, in the case of perfect capital mobility, with capital flowing 
among countries to equalise the yield to investors, the current account deficit could 
increase by exactly the same amount as the budget deficit.
6 On the other hand, while a 
fiscal expansion can drive the current account into deficit, the resulting eventual higher 
                                                 
4 According to the IMF (2007), in 2007 most OECD countries were following floating arrangements for 
their exchange rate regimes, including the euro area and several EU non-euro area countries. 
Additionally, other EU countries had soft peg arrangements while the Baltic countries had adopted 
currency board or conventional fixed peg arrangements. Interestingly, Chinn and Wei (2008) argue for 
the absence of a systematic association between a country’s nominal exchange rate regime and the speed 
of current account adjustment. Appendix A illustrates the text-book Fleming-Mundell Keynesian setup.  
5 As pointed out by Dornbusch (1976) in his model of exchange rate overshooting, the interest rate will be 
a key factor between the adjustments of the domestic economy and of the current account. According to 
Cherneff (1976), while Mundell introduced the device of the foreign balance curve, Fleming (1962) 
derived the effects of fiscal policy on the external balance, extending the Hicks-Hansen IS-LM model. 
6 With perfect capital mobility, fiscal policy cannot restore the internal balance (Mundell, 1963).   9
interest rates can push the capital account into surplus. Therefore, the final effect on 
foreign reserves accumulation is less clear, and depends on the relative sensitivity of 
international capital flows and on the responsiveness of imports to income.
7  
Some more practical caveats must, nevertheless, be borne in mind when 
discussing the twin-deficits hypothesis, since they do not necessarily move in the same 
direction. Indeed, the fact that exports minus imports is equal to the sum of private and 
public saving minus investment is simply an accounting identity, and does not mean 
that one should get such empirical regularities or relationship from the data.
8 For 
instance, if there is an exogenous increase in private investment, this can deteriorate the 
current account deficit without increasing the budget deficit. On the other hand, an 
increase in the budget deficit, for instance due to discretionary measures or to the 
working of automatic stabilizers during a slowdown, can be split between decreases in 
private investment and an increase in the current account deficit, and the resulting 
weighting of such splitting can be quite diverse.
9  
As already mentioned, empirical analysis does not necessarily provide a positive 
correlation between the budget balance and the current account balance. Indeed, the 
existing evidence is rather dissimilar, notably regarding single equation analysis, in the 
sense that budget balance deteriorations may hardly impinge on the current account 
position. Overall there is some mixed evidence in favour of a twin-deficits relationship 
(see Table 1 for a non-exhaustive overview), but this is neither robust nor stable over 
time, which may imply that fiscal tightening may not diminish the current account 
deficit.  
 
                                                 
7 Since the effect on the balance of payments of exchange rate developments depends on more 
complicated mechanisms, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), an empirical assessment is necessary. 
8 Feldstein (1992) emphasises this point. 
9 Frankel (2006) discusses the related evidence for the US.   10
Table 1 – Some existing empirical evidence regarding the twin-deficits hypothesis 
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3. Empirical analysis 
Following some of the empirical strategy existing in the literature, one may 
recall expression (4) as depicting the basis of the twin-deficits idea. Therefore, assessing   11
such hypothesis would involve testing the cointegration regression between the current 
account balance and the budget balance
10, in a panel framework, as follows, 
  it i i it it CA BUD u α β = ++  (6) 
where the index i ( ) N i ,..., 1 =  denotes the country, the index t ( ) T t ,..., 1 =  indicates the 
period. Under such a framework, we can test for the existence of a long-term 
relationship, implying a positive effect of the budget balance to the current account 
balance. The possibility of effects from the current account balance to the budget 
balance (i.e. current account deteriorations lead to higher budget deficits via lower 
growth) could of course also be assessed, but we are at this stage more interested in the 
former relationship. 
Moreover, a more encompassing specification that takes the effect of the real 
effective exchange rate (REX) on the current account balance into account can also be 
assessed: 
  it i i it i it it CA BUD REX u α βδ =+ + +. (7) 
As already mentioned and according to the literature, the real effective exchange 
rate can either have a positive or a negative effect on the current account, but its 
presence in a cointegration relationship such as in (7) cannot be discarded with 
certainty. Of course, additional factors can also be relevant for the developments of the 
current account balances. For instance, countries with a higher percentage share of 
older-age people in the population may have lower savings and higher consumption 
spending, which could translate into a larger current account deficit, while the exchange 
rate regime will also play a role. However, we are essentially interested in focussing on 
the long-term relationship between the budgetary and current balances. 
                                                 
10 It is important to have in mind that we are not trying to model the current account, and therefore our 
paper does not really fall in that category of papers. Indeed, what we are interested in assessing is the 
existence of possible long-run, cointegration relationship between budget balances and current account 
balances, using new econometric techniques that may validate such relation or not.   12
3.1. Data 
All data for current account balances, general government budget balances and 
real effective exchange rates are taken from the European Commission AMECO 
(Annual Macro-Economic Data) database, from the IMF and from the OECD 
databases.
11 We consider five different country panels: EU15, EU25, Cgroup21, 
Cgroup26, and Cgroup36. The data cover the periods from 1970 to 2007 respectively 
for the EU15 countries; from 1996 to 2007 for the EU25 countries (i.e. EU27 without 
Cyprus and Romania, due to short time span availability); from 1970 to 2007 for the 
Cgroup21 (i.e. EU15 and Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, USA); from 1987 
to 2007 for Cgroup26 (i.e. EU15 and Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
New-Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA), and from 1996 to 2007 for 
Cgroup36 (i.e. EU25 and Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA).
12 These time spans are used both for the 
panel unit root tests and for the panel cointegration analysis. On the other hand, and as 
explained in sub-section 3.4, the unbalanced panels within the period 1970-2007 are 
used for the SUR analysis. 
In Figure 1 we show a visual illustration of the budgetary and external balances 
for some of the countries included in our sample (a set of summary statistics is reported 
in Appendix B). 
 
 
                                                 
11 The AMECO codes are the following ones: .1.0.319.0.ublge, Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-): 
general government, % of GDP at market prices - excessive deficit procedure). .1.0.310.0.UBCA, 
Balance on current transactions with the rest of the world (National accounts), % of gross domestic 
product at market prices. 
12 Note that regarding the selection of the country groups, we use all OECD countries, just the EU15 
countries (the “old”15 EU members, for which a longer time span is available), and additional country 
groups where the EU New Member States are also included. Apart from this selection criteria we also 
need to adjust the country groupings according the whether all the relevant variables, for each country, 
had a unit root or not, in order to proceed with the cointegration analysis (see supra).   13
Figure 1 – Budgetary and external balances (% of GDP) 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: BUD – budget balance, CA – current account balance. 
 
3.2. 2
nd generation panel unit root analysis 
The literature on panel unit root and panel cointegration testing has been 
increasing considerably in the past years and now distinguishes between the first 
generation tests (see Maddala, and Wu, 1999; Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002; Im, Pesaran   14
and Shin, 2003) developed on the assumption of the cross-sectional independence 
among panel units (except for common time effects), the second generation tests (e.g. 
Bai and Ng, 2004; Smith et al., 2004; Moon and Perron, 2004; Choi, 2006; Pesaran, 
2007) allowing for a variety of dependence across the different units, and also panel 
data unit root tests that enable to accommodate structural breaks (e.g. Im and Lee, 
2001). In addition, in recent years it has become more widely recognized that the 
advantages of panel data methods within the macro-panel setting include the use of data 
for which the spans of individual time series data are insufficient for the study of many 
hypotheses of interest.  
To determine the degree of integration of our series of interest (current account 
balances, budget balances and real effective exchange rates) in our five panel sets, we 
employ the bootstrap tests of Smith et al. (2004), which use a sieve sampling scheme to 
account for both the time series and cross-sectional dependencies of the data.
13 The tests 
that we consider are denoted t,  LM ,  max , and min . All four tests are constructed 
with a unit root under the null hypothesis and heterogeneous autoregressive roots under 
the alternative, which indicates that a rejection should be taken as evidence in favour of 
stationarity for at least one country.
14 The results, reported in Table 1, suggest that for 
the series of the current account balances, budget balances and effective real exchange 
rates the unit root null cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level for most 
of the four tests.
15 We therefore conclude that the variables are nonstationary in our 
country panels. 
 
                                                 
13 We are grateful to Vanessa Smith for making available the Gauss codes of this test, which we adapted 
here for our purpose. 
14 The t  test can be regarded as a bootstrap version of the well-known panel unit root test of Im et al. 
(2003). The other tests are modifications of this test. 
15 The order of the sieve is permitted to increase with the number of time series observations at the rate 
T
1/3 while the lag length of the individual unit root test regressions are determined using the Campbell and 
Perron (1991) procedure. Each test regression is fitted with a constant term only.    15
Table 1 – Panel unit root test for current account balances, budget balances and 
effective real exchange rates 
# 
















t   -1.442 0.570 -2.526 0.084 -1.837  0.126 
LM   3.757 0.215 4.729 0.048 4.552  0.146 
max   -1.343 0.112 -2.068 0.140 -1.414  0.069 
min   3.359 0.015 5.027 0.098 3.588  0.048 
EU25 (1996-2007) 
t   -1.893 0.099 -2.738 0.058 -1.835  0.274 
LM   3.375 0.201 5.738 0.055 3.664  0.397 
max   -1.280 0.140 -1.909 0.234 1.174  0.977 
min   2.590 0.068 3.871 0.260 2.485  0.374 
Cgroup21 (1970-2007) 
t   -1.569 0.419 -2.327 0.284 -2.352  0.125 
LM   3.340 0.291 5.643 0.262 6.386  0.054 
max   -1.343 0.098 -1.979 0.277 -1.957  0.108 
min   2.635 0.066 4.480 0.232 5.231  0.029 
 
Cgroup26 (1987-2007) 
t   -1.493 0.507 -2.474 0.138 2.032  0.642 
LM   3.190 0.315 5.844 0.120 4.240  0.684 
max   -0.965 0.541 -2.077 0.118 -1.909  0.331 
min   1.870 0.399 4.554 0.127 3.856  0.395 
Cgroup36 (1996-2007) 
t   -2.647 0.155 -2.702 0.118 -2.336  0.285 
LM   5.524 0.060 5.900 0.027 4.967  0.319 
max   -1.977 0.208 -2.055 0.122 -1.141  0.865 
min   3.768 0.282 4.231 0.130 2.438  0.840 
Notes: 
a) Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one country. All tests are based on an 
intercept and 5000 bootstrap replications to compute the p-values.  
b) EU25 countries includes EU27 without Cyprus and Romania; group21 includes EU15 and Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, USA; Cgroup26 includes EU15 and Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA; and Cgroup36 includes EU25 and 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA.  
# Results based on the test of Smith et al. (2004). 
 
3.3. Panel cointegration 
We now proceed by testing for the existence of cointegration between current 
account balances and budget balances and also between current account balances, 
budget balances and effective real exchange rates (in conjecture with equations 6 and 7),   16
using the bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton 
(2007). Unlike the panel data cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999, 2004), generalized 
by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006), this test has the appealing advantage that 
the joint null hypothesis is cointegration for all countries in the panel. Therefore, in case 
of non rejection of the null, we can assume that a cointegration relationship for the 
whole set of countries of the panel exists, which is crucial to assess the twin-deficits 
hypothesis. On the contrary, performing the Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) 
methodology raises the problem that a single series from the panel might be responsible 
for rejecting the joint null of non-stationary or non-cointegration, hence not necessarily 
implying that a cointegration relationship holds for the whole set of countries. This 
could be less helpful to investigate the two imbalances relationship since no information 
is provided on which panel members are responsible for this rejection, that is, for which 
country the cointegration relationship does not hold. 
The test developed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) relies on the popular 
Lagrange multiplier test of McCoskey and Kao (1998), and permits correlation to be 
accommodated both within and between the individual cross-sectional units. In 
addition, this bootstrap test is based on the sieve-sampling scheme, and has the 
advantage of significantly reducing the distortions of the asymptotic test.
16 The panel 
cointegration results reported in Table 2 for a model including either a constant term or 
a linear trend, clearly indicate the absence of a cointegrating relationship between 
current account balances and budget balances for three panels sets out of five (EU15, 
Cgroup21, Cgroup26). This result is valid for any specification of the deterministic 
component considered, and is robust to the critical value used (asymptotic or bootstrap) 
for the conventional levels of significance. On the contrary, for the EU25 and Cgroup36 
                                                 
16 We are grateful to Joakim Westerlund for sending us his Gauss codes.   17
panel sets cointegration is detected for a model including a constant term in the EU25 
panel set and for a model including either a constant term or a linear trend in the 
Cgroup36 panel set using bootstrap critical values. 
 










Model with a constant term  8.580  0.000  0.004 
Model including a time trend  9.477  0.000  0.000 
 
EU25 (1996-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  0.452  0.326  0.606 
Model including a time trend  3.685  0.000  0.227 
 
Cgroup21 (1970-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  9.183  0.000  0.016 
Model including a time trend  11.548  0.000  0.000 
 
Cgroup26 (1987-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  3.871  0.000  0.019 
Model including a time trend  6.310  0.000  0.000 
 
Cgroup36 (1996-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  0.608  0.272  0.847 
Model including a time trend  5.078  0.000  0.540 
Notes: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between current account balances and budget 
balances.  
b) EU25 countries includes EU27 without Cyprus and Romania; Cgroup21includes EU15 and 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, USA; Cgroup26 includes EU15 and Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA; and 
Cgroup36 includes EU25 and Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA. 
  # Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
Interestingly, performing the panel data cointegration tests between current 
account balances, budget balances and effective real exchange rates (see Table 3) 
produces significant evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegration relationship 
for three panels sets out of five (EU15, Cgroup21, Cgroup26) for any specification of 
the deterministic component considered if one relies on asymptotic p-values. Results are 
even stronger when using bootstrap p-values since the null hypothesis of cointegration   18
cannot be rejected for the five panel sets for any specification of the deterministic 
component considered. These results underline the crucial importance of considering 
the effect of the effective real exchange rate in assessing the twin cointegration between 
budgetary and current account balances. 
 
Table 3 – Panel cointegration test results between current account balances, budget 









Model with a constant term  -2.646  0.848  0.996 
Model including a time trend  -2.800  0.901  0.999 
 
EU25 (1996-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  7.076  0.000  0.833 
Model including a time trend  21.569  0.000  0.629 
 
Cgroup21 (1970-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  -1.075  0.859  0.999 
Model including a time trend  -3.366  0.892  0.998 
 
Cgroup26 (1987-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  0.059  0.477  0.996 
Model including a time trend  0.592  0.277  0.999 
 
Cgroup36 (1996-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  12.847  0.000  0.672 
Model including a time trend  43.729  0.000  0.438 
Notes: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between current account balances, budget 
balances and effective real exchange rates.  
b) EU25 countries includes EU27 without Cyprus and Romania; Cgroup21includes EU15 and 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, USA; Cgroup26 includes EU15 and Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA; and 
Cgroup36 includes EU25 and Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New-Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, USA. 
# Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
3.4. SUR cointegration relationships 
If a cointegrating relationship exists for all countries of a given panel set, we 
estimate the systems (6) and (7) by the Zellner (1962) approach to handle cross-
sectional dependence among countries using the SUR estimator. It is now well known 
that the presence of cross-section dependence renders the ordinary least squares 
estimator inefficient and biased, which makes it a poor candidate for inference. A   19
common approach to alleviate this problem is to use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
techniques. However, as noted by Westerlund (2007), this approach is not feasible when 
the cross-sectional dimension N is of the same order of magnitude as the time series 
dimension, since the covariance matrix of the regression errors then becomes rank 
deficient. In fact, for the SUR approach to work properly, one usually requires the time 
series dimension being substantially larger than N, a condition that is only fulfilled for 
the EU15 and Cgroup21 panels over the 1970-2007 period, but not for the EU25, 
Cgroup26, and Cgroup36 panels over the 1996-2007, 1987-2007 and 1996-2007 
periods. As a consequence, for the last three panels the SUR estimation technique is 
actually performed on the (unbalanced) 1970-2007 period, according to data 
availability. This way of proceeding enables us to estimate the individual coefficients βi 
in a panel framework and hence to investigate the relationship between budget and 
current account balances for each country taken individually. Those SUR estimation 
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Table 4a – SUR estimation for the EU25 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 




Probability Country Coefficients 





Austria  α  0.10 0.27  0.78 Lithuania  α  -9.41 -12.54  0.00 
  β  0.22 3.05  0.00   β  -0.09 -0.58  0.56 
Belgium  α  2.94 6.83  0.00 Luxembourg  α  13.97 23.42  0.00 
  β  0.16 4.01  0.00   β  -0.27 -2.29  0.02 
Bulgaria  α  -8.07 -6.16  0.00  Latvia  α  -7.08 -4.46  0.00 
  β  -0.32 -1.66  0.10    β  2.38 6.41  0.00 
Czech Republic  α  -2.63 -4.91  0.00  Malta  α  -0.99 -0.65  0.51 
  β  0.26 3.20  0.00   β  0.67 3.09  0.00 
Denmark  α  -0.62 -1.41  0.16  Netherlands α  4.52 11.31  0.00 
  β  0.04 0.69  0.49   β  0.14 1.79  0.07 
Estonia  α  -10.00 -11.58  0.00  Poland  α  -2.81 -3.84  0.00 
  β  0.28 1.33  0.18   β  -0.08 -0.65  0.52 
Finland  α  1.92 2.72  0.01 Portugal  α  -5.02 -5.64  0.00 
  β  -0.40 -6.59  0.00    β  0.07 0.51  0.61 
France  α  -0.78 -2.88  0.00  Spain  α  -4.15 -9.87  0.00 
  β  -0.06 -0.84  0.40    β  -0.61 -10.41  0.00 
Germany  α  1.76 4.55  0.00 Slovakia  α  -7.36 -8.15  0.00 
  β  0.04 0.44  0.66   β  -0.31 -4.46  0.00 
Greece  α  -3.48 -4.75  0.00  Slovenia  α  -2.53 -5.97  0.00 
  β  -0.06 -1.13  0.26    β  -0.30 -2.90  0.00 
Hungary  α  -8.38 -5.56  0.00  Sweden  α  1.69 3.32  0.00 
  β  -0.23 -1.02  0.31    β  -0.09 -2.54  0.01 
Ireland  α  -1.95 -2.87  0.00  UK  α  -1.98 -7.46  0.00 
  β  0.24 3.75  0.00   β  -0.18 -3.99  0.00 
Italy  α  -1.10 -2.71  0.01          
  β  -0.10 -2.32  0.02          
Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Unbalanced 
system, total observations: 718. 
 
Regarding the SUR results for the relationship between budgetary and current 
account balances, it is possible to observe a statistically significant (at the 5 per cent 
level) positive effect of budget balances on current account balances for several EU 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, and Malta (see Table 4a). 
On the other hand,  a statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level) negative effect of 
budget balances on current account balances can be found for Finland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK, although the magnitude 
of the estimated β coefficient varies considerably across countries. In terms of the 
broader Cgroup36 panel (see Table 4b), the previous country specific findings for the 
EU25 panel are broadly confirmed while the heterogeneity of the results is the main   21
feature, both regarding the sign of the estimated effect of budget balances on current 
account balances and regarding its absolute magnitude, but there is no evidence pointing 
to a close relationship. We also assessed the homogeneity of βi across country using a 
Wald test, but such null hypothesis was rejected. 
 
Table 4b – SUR estimation for the Cgroup36 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 




Probability Country Coefficients 





Australia  α  -3.70 -13.76  0.00  Latvia  α  -6.85 -4.69  0.00 
  β  0.14 2.30  0.02   β  2.41 7.13  0.00 
Austria  α  0.28 0.81  0.42 Lithuania  α  -9.44 -13.52  0.00 
  β  0.31 4.80  0.00   β  -0.07 -0.55  0.59 
Belgium  α  3.39 8.88  0.00 Luxembourg  α  14.11 25.52  0.00 
  β  0.25 9.39  0.00   β  -0.31 -3.52  0.00 
Bulgaria  α  -8.22 -6.66  0.00  Malta  α  -0.36 -0.25  0.80 
  β  -0.40 -2.23  0.03    β  0.71 3.55  0.00 
Canada  α  0.18 0.65  0.52 Mexico  α  -2.49 -4.38  0.00 
  β  0.30 9.43  0.00   β  -0.19 -2.93  0.00 
Czech Republic  α  -2.69 -5.47  0.00  Netherlands α  4.74 12.90  0.00 
  β  0.27 3.78  0.00   β  0.23 3.60  0.00 
Denmark  α  -0.65 -1.57  0.12  New  Zealand  α  -4.83 -23.44  0.00 
  β  0.06 1.73  0.08   β  -0.47 -9.10  0.00 
Estonia  α  -9.98 -12.08  0.00  Norway  α  -0.30 -0.28  0.78 
  β  0.26 1.32  0.19   β  0.75 11.10  0.00 
Finland  α  1.83 2.88  0.00 Poland  α  -2.73 -4.05  0.00 
  β  -0.36 -8.47  0.00    β  -0.05 -0.47  0.64 
France  α  -1.04 -4.40  0.00  Portugal  α  -4.29 -5.63  0.00 
  β  -0.16 -4.02  0.00    β  0.23 2.29  0.02 
Germany  α  1.93 5.63  0.00 Spain  α  -4.19 -10.38  0.00 
  β  0.12 1.97  0.05   β  -0.64 -13.43  0.00 
Greece  α  -3.65 -5.38  0.00  Slovakia  α  -6.83 -8.06  0.00 
  β  -0.09 -1.94  0.05    β  -0.27 -4.25  0.00 
Hungary  α  -8.17 -5.91  0.00  Slovenia  α  -2.57 -6.50  0.00 
  β  -0.24 -1.18  0.24    β  -0.34 -3.60  0.00 
Iceland  α  -6.41 -7.25  0.00  Sweden  α  1.69 3.70  0.00 
  β  -1.02 -5.44  0.00    β  -0.07 -2.49  0.01 
Ireland  α  -1.47 -2.41  0.02  Switzerland α  8.61 12.96  0.00 
  β  0.34 7.93  0.00   β  -0.04 -0.14  0.89 
Italy  α  -0.99 -2.65  0.01  Turkey  α  -5.18 -8.01  0.00 
  β  -0.08 -2.24  0.03    β  -0.15 -2.49  0.01 
Japan  α  1.90 8.09  0.00 UK  α  -1.89 -7.78  0.00 
  β  -0.11 -4.59  0.00    β  -0.15 -4.36  0.00 
Korea  α  -0.80 -1.01  0.31  USA  α  -1.84 -5.92  0.00 
  β  0.55 2.16  0.03   β  0.06 1.63  0.10 
Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Unbalanced 
system, total observations: 1075. 
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For the case of the relationship between budgetary and current account balances, 
and the  effective real exchange rate the results are reported in Tables 4c, 4d and 4e, 
respectively for country groups EU15, EU25, and Cgroup36.
17 
 
Table 4c – SUR estimation for the EU15 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 











Austria  α  -19.76 -4.47  0.00  Italy  α  7.84 5.76 0.00 
  β  0.68 4.74 0.00    β  -0.10 -2.58 0.01 
  δ  0.21 4.52 0.00    δ  -0.08 -6.41 0.00 
Belgium  α  27.00 9.38  0.00  Luxembourg  α  17.36 2.00 0.05 
  β  0.27 6.31 0.00    β  -0.53 -2.54 0.01 
  δ  -0.22 -8.25  0.00    δ  -0.03 -0.33 0.74 
Denmark  α  -28.49 -8.55  0.00  Netherlands α  13.20 3.00 0.00 
  β  0.07 1.18 0.24    β  0.13 1.18 0.24 
  δ  0.28 8.40 0.00    δ  -0.08 -1.98 0.05 
Finland  α  25.48 7.50  0.00  Portugal  α  20.95 5.10 0.00 
  β  -0.04 -0.36  0.72    β  0.23 1.56 0.12 
  δ  -0.21 -7.09  0.00    δ  -0.27 -6.32 0.00 
France  α  6.25 1.68 0.09  Spain  α  10.48 5.91 0.00 
  β  -0.03 -0.32  0.75    β  -0.73 -10.23 0.00 
  δ  -0.06 -1.91  0.06    δ  -0.14 -8.52 0.00 
Germany  α  23.06 7.47  0.00  Sweden  α  22.60 13.00 0.00 
  β  -0.04 -0.43  0.67    β  0.05 0.94 0.35 
  δ  -0.20 -6.99  0.00    δ  -0.18 -12.23 0.00 
Greece  α  13.83 2.46  0.01  UK  α  -0.32 -0.18 0.86 
  β  0.03 0.28 0.78    β  -0.14 -2.44 0.01 
  δ  -0.16 -3.21  0.00    δ  -0.02 -0.93 0.35 
Ireland  α  -13.21 -2.70  0.01         
  β  0.22 2.69 0.01         
  δ  0.10 2.35 0.02         
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced 
system, total observations: 570. 
 
According to the SUR results there is a statistically significant effect of the real 
effective exchange rate on the current account balance for the majority of the countries. 
Some exceptions occur for the cases of Luxembourg and the UK in the EU15 panel, for 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the UK in the EU25 panel, and for The 
Czech Republic, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Switzerland and the 
UK in the Cgroup36 panel. 
                                                 
17 Additional results for the country groups Cgroup21 and Cgroup26 are presented in Appendix C.   23
Table 4d – SUR estimation for the EU25 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 











Austria  α  -20.02 -4.73  0.00  Lithuania  α  -9.82 -3.19 0.00 
  β  0.71 5.18 0.00   β  0.02 0.11 0.91 
  δ  0.21 4.79 0.00   δ  0.01 0.15 0.88 
Belgium  α  27.25 10.02  0.00 Luxembourg α  17.44 2.07 0.04 
  β  0.27 6.76 0.00   β  -0.55 -2.71 0.01 
  δ  -0.22 -8.84  0.00   δ  -0.03 -0.35 0.73 
Bulgaria  α  16.90 6.83  0.00 Latvia  α  8.17 1.15 0.25 
  β  -0.47 -2.83  0.00   β  -1.73 -3.38 0.00 
  δ  -0.24 -9.97  0.00   δ  -0.26 -3.13 0.00 
Czech Republic  α  -4.20 -1.90  0.06 Malta  α  -54.75 -5.38  0.00 
  β  0.18 2.20 0.03   β  1.38 7.21 0.00 
  δ  0.01 0.61 0.54   δ  0.62 5.46 0.00 
Denmark  α  -28.81 -9.07  0.00 Netherlands  α  13.06 3.04 0.00 
  β  0.06 1.16 0.25   β  0.15 1.35 0.18 
  δ  0.28 8.91 0.00   δ  -0.08 -1.99 0.05 
Estonia  α  -1.33 -0.40  0.69 Poland  α  6.73 2.88 0.00 
  β  -0.49 -2.50  0.01   β  -0.03 -0.28 0.78 
  δ  -0.08 -2.59  0.01   δ  -0.10 -3.94 0.00 
Finland  α  26.13 7.86  0.00 Portugal  α  21.44 5.39 0.00 
  β  -0.03 -0.31  0.76   β  0.25 1.76 0.08 
  δ  -0.21 -7.47  0.00   δ  -0.27 -6.61 0.00 
France  α  6.01 1.70 0.09 Spain  α  10.72 6.25 0.00 
  β  -0.04 -0.49  0.62   β  -0.74 -10.68 0.00 
  δ  -0.06 -1.96  0.05   δ  -0.15 -8.98 0.00 
Germany  α  23.58 8.13  0.00 Slovakia  α  -14.20 -4.90  0.00 
  β  -0.01 -0.15  0.88   β  -0.05 -0.34 0.73 
  δ  -0.20 -7.60  0.00   δ  0.07 3.26 0.00 
Greece  α  16.27 3.07  0.00 Slovenia  α  14.88 1.67 0.10 
  β  0.06 0.58 0.56   β  -0.22 -2.21 0.03 
  δ  -0.19 -3.87  0.00   δ  -0.17 -1.93 0.05 
Hungary  α  -18.41 -9.34  0.00 Sweden  α  22.47 13.11 0.00 
  β  0.09 0.67 0.51   β  0.04 0.89 0.38 
  δ  0.11 5.96 0.00   δ  -0.18 -12.32 0.00 
Ireland  α  -13.90 -2.89  0.00 UK  α  -0.51 -0.31 0.76 
  β  0.23 2.81 0.01   β  -0.15 -2.77 0.01 
  δ  0.11 2.54 0.01   δ  -0.02 -0.89 0.38 
Italy  α  7.90 6.01 0.00       
  β  -0.10 -2.66  0.01       
  δ  -0.08 -6.69  0.00       
Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Unbalanced 
system, total observations: 705. 
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Table 4e – SUR estimation for the Cgroup36 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 











Australia  α  -7.77 -10.19  0.00  Latvia  α  9.33 1.37  0.17 
  β  0.12 2.12  0.03   β  -1.89 -3.93 0.00 
  δ  0.03 5.51  0.00   δ  -0.27 -3.43 0.00 
Austria  α  -24.63 -7.43  0.00 Lithuania  α  -10.76 -3.86  0.00 
  β  0.88 8.79  0.00   β  -0.15 -0.85 0.39 
  δ  0.26 7.56  0.00   δ  0.01 0.40  0.69 
Belgium  α  28.24 12.12  0.00 Luxembourg  α  11.09 1.90 0.06 
  β  0.28 7.68  0.00   β  -0.46 -3.51 0.00 
  δ  -0.23 -10.81  0.00   δ  0.03 0.58  0.56 
Bulgaria  α  17.53 7.47  0.00 Malta  α  -49.09 -5.06  0.00 
  β  -0.50 -3.20  0.00   β  1.35 7.34  0.00 
  δ  -0.25 -10.67  0.00   δ  0.56 5.16  0.00 
Canada  α  9.02 8.66  0.00 Mexico  α  -7.01 -3.37 0.00 
  β  0.24 6.63  0.00   β  -0.22 -3.21 0.00 
  δ  -0.07 -8.75  0.00   δ  0.05 2.36  0.02 
Czech Republic  α  -5.19 -2.56  0.01 Netherlands  α  18.02 6.55 0.00 
  β  0.18 2.34  0.02   β  0.18 2.50  0.01 
  δ  0.02 1.11  0.27   δ  -0.12 -4.91 0.00 
Denmark  α  -28.77 -11.30  0.00 New  Zealand  α  -2.77 -1.59 0.11 
  β  0.04 0.98  0.33   β  -0.45 -8.34 0.00 
  δ  0.28 11.08  0.00   δ  -0.02 -1.20 0.23 
Estonia  α  -1.55 -0.50  0.62 Norway  α  25.23 2.67 0.01 
  β  -0.50 -2.72  0.01   β  0.72 8.11  0.00 
  δ  -0.08 -2.64  0.01   δ  -0.24 -2.67 0.01 
Finland  α  28.80 12.71  0.00 Poland  α  5.76 2.64  0.01 
  β  -0.04 -0.61  0.54   β  -0.02 -0.18 0.86 
  δ  -0.23 -12.18  0.00   δ  -0.09 -3.79 0.00 
France  α  4.44 1.46  0.14 Portugal  α  21.85 6.58 0.00 
  β  -0.10 -1.33  0.19   β  0.32 2.72  0.01 
  δ  -0.05 -1.80  0.07   δ  -0.27 -8.02 0.00 
Germany  α  24.32 10.89  0.00 Spain  α  13.53 11.31 0.00 
  β  0.01 0.14  0.89   β  -0.78 -15.89 0.00 
  δ  -0.21 -10.20  0.00   δ  -0.18 -15.44 0.00 
Greece  α  28.13 8.13  0.00 Slovakia  α  -13.41 -4.89  0.00 
  β  0.21 3.18  0.00   β  -0.07 -0.53 0.60 
  δ  -0.29 -9.39  0.00   δ  0.07 3.10  0.00 
Hungary  α  -18.21 -10.16  0.00 Slovenia  α  12.92 1.59 0.11 
  β  0.05 0.40  0.69   β  -0.25 -2.79 0.01 
  δ  0.10 6.30  0.00   δ  -0.15 -1.87 0.06 
Iceland  α  -12.98 -1.78  0.07 Sweden  α  22.94 16.84 0.00 
  β  -1.11 -5.50  0.00   β  0.09 2.63  0.01 
  δ  0.06 0.91  0.37   δ  -0.18 -16.22 0.00 
Ireland  α  -11.60 -3.50  0.00 Switzerland  α  -5.64 -0.44 0.66 
  β  0.27 4.72  0.00   β  0.23 0.66  0.51 
  δ  0.09 3.03  0.00   δ  0.14 1.11  0.27 
Italy  α  7.51 7.04  0.00 Turkey  α  2.90 1.02  0.31 
  β  -0.08 -2.34  0.02   β  -0.12 -1.85 0.06 
  δ  -0.08 -7.73  0.00   δ  -0.09 -2.94 0.00 
Japan  α  0.73 1.45  0.15 UK  α  0.21 0.15  0.88 
  β  -0.06 -2.06  0.04   β  -0.11 -2.56 0.01 
  δ  0.02 2.60  0.01   δ  -0.02 -1.53 0.13 
Korea  α  13.69 3.98  0.00 USA  α  1.46 2.01  0.04 
  β  0.16 0.63  0.53   β  0.01 0.32  0.75 
  δ  -0.12 -4.43  0.00   δ  -0.03 -5.01 0.00 
Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Unbalanced 
system, total observations: 1062. 
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Table 5 summarises the SUR results regarding the sign of the β coefficient (the 
effect between budget balances and current account balances) for the EU15 and 
Cgroup36 panels, both for the specification without and with the effective real exchange 
rate. In addition, Figure 2 illustrates the statistically significant estimated β coefficients 
for each country, regarding the results for the Cgroup36 panel.  
 
Table 5 – Sign of estimated β in (6),  it i i it it CA BUD u α β = ++ , and in (7), 
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To assess the relevance of possible different regimes notably in the run-up to the 
EMU we performed a similar analysis for the EU15 panel for two sub-periods, 1970-
1989 and 1990-2007. The results, reported in Appendix D, show significant evidence in 
favour of the existence of a unit root in the current account balances, budget balances 
and effective real exchange rates series for the two sub-periods, which is in line with 
what we found for the full 1970-2007 period. Moreover, we are now able to find a 
significant cointegrating relationship between current account balances and budget 
balances for the sub-period 1990-2007, which was not the case for the full sample. It is 
also possible to confirm the relevant role of the effective real exchange rates in a long-
run relationship between current account balances, budget balances and effective real 
exchange rates series for the two sub-periods.  
Finally, the SUR estimations confirm the existence of different effects of budget 
balances and effective real exchange rates on the current account balances for the sub-
periods 1970-1989 and 1990-2007.  Interestingly, the results also show that the 
estimated relationship between budget balances and current account balances, which 
was positive in the first sub-period, became negative in the second sub-period for 
Belgium, France, Greece, and Portugal.
18 To our mind, this may reveals different 
economic phases, before and after 1990. For instance, one observed a decline in private-
sector saving rates in several OECD countries in the late 1990s, while fiscal 




In this paper we assessed the existence of a cointegration relationship between 
current account and budget balances, and between current account, budget balances and 
                                                 
18 Kim and Roubini (2007) also find some evidence of such so-called twin-divergence. 
19 See, for instance, De Serres and Pelgrin (2003).   27
effective real exchange rates, using recent bootstrap panel cointegration techniques and 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression methods, which, to the best of our knowledge, was 
not employed before in this context. For the period from 1970 to 2007, and for different 
EU and OECD country groupings, we also investigate the magnitude of these 
relationships for each country. The results of the panel unit root tests that we performed 
suggest that for the series of the current account balances, budget balances and effective 
real exchange rates, the unit root null cannot be rejected at the usual significance levels 
for most of the tests.  
On the basis of the stationarity results, we tested for the existence of 
cointegration between current account balances and budget balances and also between 
current account balances, budget balances and effective real exchange rates using the 
bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). For the 
EU25 and Cgroup36 panel sets cointegration is detected between budgetary and current 
account balances for a model including a constant term in the EU25 panel set, and for a 
model including either a constant term or a linear trend in the Cgroup36 panel, set using 
bootstrap critical values.  
In addition, performing the panel data cointegration tests between current 
account balances, budget balances and effective real exchange rates produces significant 
evidence in favour of the existence of a cointegration relationship for three panel sets 
out of five (EU15, Cgroup21, Cgroup26) for any specification of the deterministic 
component considered if one relies on asymptotic p-values. Results are even stronger if 
one uses bootstrap p-values since in this case the null hypothesis of cointegration cannot 
be rejected for the five panel sets for any specification of the deterministic component 
considered. This underlines the relevance of considering the effect of the effective real   28
exchange rate in assessing the cointegration hypothesis between budgetary and current 
account balances. 
The SUR analysis shows a statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level) 
positive effect of budget balances on current account balances for several EU countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, and Malta. On the other hand,  a 
statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level) negative effect of budget balances on 
current account balances can be found for Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sweden and the UK, although the magnitude of the estimated β coefficient 
varies considerably across countries. 
The country specific findings for the EU25 panel are essentially confirmed for 
the broader Cgroup36 panel. In addition, the heterogeneity of the results is the main 
feature, both regarding the sign of the estimated effect of budget balances on current 
account balances and regarding its absolute magnitude, but there is no evidence pointing 
to a close relationship. Therefore, additional factors other than fiscal policy contributed 
to the development of the current account balances of the countries in our sample, for 
instance, liquidity constraints in the international capital market, and different monetary 
policy regimes (see, for instance, Gruber and Kamin, 2007).  
From a policy purpose, one main result is that one has to be aware that the 
implementation of fiscal tightening may not diminish the current account deficit. 
Indeed, our overall evidence, although pointing in some cases to a twin-deficits 
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Appendix A – Text-book imbalances relationship 
Figure A1 provides a standard text-book illustration to the link between the 
budget and the current account balances with flexible exchanges rates in the Fleming-
Mundell Keynesian setup. Starting from the initial position at point A in Figure A1.a, a 
fiscal expansion that increases the budget deficit shifts IS0 to the right to IS1 in B. At 
point B, with a higher domestic interest rate, there is an inflow of capital and a surplus 
vis-à-vis the exterior given that point B is above the BP curve. This will lead to an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, moving BP0 upwards to BP1, which deteriorates 
the current account. In turn, the appreciation drives the IS1 curve downwards to IS2, 
intersecting the LM and the BP curves at point C. Moreover, one may also point out that 
the need for the government to finance the budget deficit by issuing additional 
government debt, which may be bought by foreign investors, will also increase interest 
income outflows and contribute to deteriorate the external balance. 
 
Figure A1 – Fiscal policy and external position under flexible exchange rates 
 A1.a – high capital mobility  A1.b – low capital mobility 
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Moreover, in the case of perfect capital mobility (with a horizontal BP curve) 
capital inflows would be large enough to appreciate sufficiently the domestic currency 
bringing the IS curve fully back to its initial position, and the current account deficit 
will have increased by the same amount as the budget deficit. On the other hand, in the 
case where the BP curve is steeper and less interest-elastic than the LM curve, implying 
lower capital mobility, as in Figure A1.b, a fiscal expansion from point A to B results in 
an external deficit at the initial exchange rate. Thus, there will be a depreciation of the 
domestic currency, with an additional stimulating effect to the economy, thereby 
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Appendix B – Summary statistics 
 
Table B1 – Summary statistics (1970-2007) 
  Current account balance (% of GDP) 
  AUS AUT BEL BGR CAN CHE CZE DEU DNK ESP  EST  FIN 
Mean  -3.9 -0.4  2.1 -7.1 -0.8 6.8 -3.5 1.7 -0.6 -2.7 -8.9 1.0
Max  1.4 5.3 5.6 3.5 3.3 17.5 1.7 6.0 3.6 1.5 1.2 10.0
Min  -6.2 -5.2 -4.0  -18.1 -4.2 0.1 -6.7 -1.8 -5.5 -9.8  -15.7 -7.5
Std.  Dev.  1.6 2.4 2.7 6.5 2.2 4.7 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.1 4.3 4.8
Observ.  38 38 38 19 38 38 18 38 38 38 17 38
  FRA  GBR  GRC  HUN  IRL ISL ITA JPN KOR  LTU  LUX  LVA 
Mean  -0.6 -1.5 -3.2 -6.7 -2.9 -6.0 -0.4 2.2 -0.4 -9.0 13.4 -7.0
Max  2.5  1.9  3.1 -2.7 3.7 1.9 3.1 4.8 12.2 -3.1 25.1 17.8
Min  -4.0 -5.1  -11.1 -9.6 -14.6 -26.7 -4.3 -1.1 -10.6 -14.6  7.8 -23.8
Std.  Dev.  1.6 1.6 4.4 2.0 4.6 7.6 1.7 1.6 4.6 3.5 3.5 11.0
Observ.  38 38 38 17 38 38 38 38 38 16 38 19
  MEX MLT NLD NOR NZL POL  PRT  SVK SVN SWE TUR USA 
Mean  -2.4  -5.7 4.2 3.9 -5.1 -2.6 -5.3 -4.4 0.1 1.7  -4.2 -2.0
Max  5.3 2.5 8.6  17.4 1.9 2.3 5.5 5.3 8.5 7.3 1.5 1.3
Min  -6.9 -12.5  -0.9 -12.3 -13.3 -6.2 -13.5 -9.4 -3.5 -2.6  -20.0 -6.1
Std.  Dev.  3.0 3.9 2.3 8.0 2.7 2.4 4.4 4.1 3.3 3.3 4.5 2.1
Observ.  38 15 38 38 38 19 38 17 20 38 38 38
  Budget balance (% of GDP) 
  AUS AUT BEL BGR CAN CHE CZE DEU DNK ESP  EST  FIN 
Mean  -1.8 -2.1 -5.2 -1.3 -3.0 -0.8 -5.0 -2.2 0.1 -2.3  1.5 2.5
Max  2.3 1.9 0.6 5.3 3.0 2.2 -2.9 1.3 5.0 1.8 9.5 7.8
Min  -5.4 -5.6  -15.3  -13.2 -9.1 -3.9 -13.4 -5.6 -8.2 -6.6 -3.6 -8.3
Std.  Dev.  2.3 1.8 4.2 4.9 3.6 1.6 2.9 1.6 3.3 2.5 3.0 3.9
Observ.  38 38 38 17 38 25 13 38 38 38 15 38
  FRA  GBR  GRC  HUN  IRL ISL ITA JPN KOR  LTU  LUX  LVA 
Mean  -2.3 -2.7 -5.9 -6.4 -4.1 -0.5 -7.3 -3.2 2.2 -2.4  2.0 -0.1
Max  0.9  3.6  0.7 -2.9 4.5 6.3 -0.8 2.1 5.4 -0.5  6.1 6.8
Min  -6.4 -7.9  -14.3 -9.2 -12.5 -4.7 -12.4 -11.2 -0.8  -11.9 -2.7 -3.9
Std.  Dev.  1.7 2.5 4.0 2.0 5.0 2.6 3.5 3.3 1.5 2.8 1.9 2.8
Observ.  38 38 38 12 38 38 38 38 33 15 38 18
  MEX MLT NLD NOR NZL POL  PRT  SVK SVN SWE TUR USA 
Mean -5.8  -6.0  -2.5  5.6 0.4 -4.2 -4.3 -7.3 -2.8 -0.4 -7.8 -2.9
Max  -0.9  -1.8 2.0  18.0 4.5 5.8 2.7 -2.4 -0.7 5.1 0.8 1.6
Min  -24.8 -10.1  -6.2  -1.9 -6.4 -8.5 -8.7 -30.7 -8.6 -11.3 -21.4 -5.8
Std.  Dev.  5.0 2.7 2.1 4.9 3.4 3.0 2.9 7.1 2.0 4.3 6.1 1.9
Observ.  28 13 38 38 22 17 38 15 13 38 21 38
  Real effective exchange rate (2000=100) 
  AUS AUT BEL BGR CAN CHE CZE DEU DNK ESP  EST  FIN 
Mean  127.9 100.1 108.3 101.0 124.2 98.1 104.3 108.3 100.0 102.8 100.0 118.4
Max  169.5 109.4 125.0 134.4 151.0 114.8 133.9 120.0 109.1 120.9 121.1 148.6
Min  96.2 86.3 98.2 65.4 96.0 70.6 77.0 98.6 88.4 81.9 60.8 100.0
Std. Dev.  20.5  5.8  6.6  22.1 16.1 10.1 18.2 5.7 5.7 9.6  16.8 13.8
Observ.  38 38 38 14 38 38 15 38 38 38 14 38
  FRA  GBR  GRC  HUN  IRL ISL ITA JPN KOR  LTU  LUX  LVA 
Mean 108.8  92.0  102.9  109.0 109.7 101.7 107.8 73.5 117.5 90.2  106.6 87.7
Max  118.9 109.0 119.2 140.6 132.4 117.1 124.1 105.5 173.1 107.0 118.0 100.0
Min  99.8 77.4 87.5 88.7 99.1 88.8 92.9 40.1 81.5 49.4 99.9 63.7
Std. Dev.  4.4  7.7  7.6  17.5 8.3 7.2 8.8 17.9 18.3 19.0  5.2 11.2
Observ.  38 38 38 15 38 38 38 38 38 14 38 14
  MEX MLT NLD NOR NZL POL  PRT  SVK SVN SWE TUR USA 
Mean 88.7  94.4  110.0  107.1 118.7 94.6 94.5 110.1 102.9 115.3 100.2 97.5
Max  115.0 100.3 121.4 114.0 139.0 112.9 110.1 159.4 106.9 139.2 141.4 123.0
Min 56.3  88.0  100.0  100.0 98.9 73.3 80.7 86.0 95.4 91.7 66.0 83.6
Std.  Dev. 15.2 5.1 5.4 4.5 10.4 13.1 9.8 23.8 3.4 14.7 21.9 11.0
Observ.  38 12 38 38 38 15 38 14 14 38 38 38  36
Appendix C – Additional country group SUR results 
Table C1 – SUR estimation for the Cgroup21 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 











Australia  α  -7.61 -9.26  0.00  Island  α  -14.91 -1.87  0.06 
  β  0.11 1.74 0.08   β  -1.05 -4.67 0.00 
  δ  0.03 4.81 0.00   δ  0.08 1.07 0.29 
Austria  α  -21.27 -5.61  0.00 Japan  α  1.00 1.75 0.08 
  β  0.78 6.65 0.00   β  -0.06 -1.74 0.08 
  δ  0.22 5.73 0.00   δ  0.01 1.86 0.06 
Belgium  α  27.73 10.84  0.00 Luxembourg α  12.31 1.93 0.05 
  β  0.28 7.20 0.00   β  -0.52 -3.56 0.00 
  δ  -0.22 -9.56  0.00   δ  0.02 0.35 0.73 
Canada  α  8.77 7.85 0.00 Netherlands  α  17.49 5.83 0.00 
  β  0.24 5.90 0.00   β  0.19 2.43 0.02 
  δ  -0.07 -7.85  0.00   δ  -0.12 -4.33 0.00 
Denmark  α  -27.78 -9.86  0.00 Norway  α  24.55 2.27 0.02 
  β  0.04 0.86 0.39   β  0.69 6.90 0.00 
  δ  0.27 9.70 0.00   δ  -0.23 -2.26 0.02 
Finland  α  28.96 12.21  0.00 Portugal  α  21.72 5.99 0.00 
  β  -0.01 -0.18  0.86   β  0.29 2.29 0.02 
  δ  -0.24 -11.68  0.00   δ  -0.27 -7.33 0.00 
France  α  5.13 1.60 0.11 Spain  α  12.26 8.86 0.00 
  β  -0.09 -1.21  0.23   β  -0.73 -13.54 0.00 
  δ  -0.05 -1.90  0.06   δ  -0.16 -12.33 0.00 
Germany  α  23.66 9.43  0.00 Sweden  α  23.08 15.62 0.00 
  β  -0.02 -0.19  0.85   β  0.10 2.63 0.01 
  δ  -0.20 -8.84  0.00   δ  -0.18 -14.80 0.00 
Greece  α  26.91 6.71  0.00 UK  α  -0.26 -0.17 0.87 
  β  0.18 2.27 0.02   β  -0.12 -2.36 0.02 
  δ  -0.28 -7.86  0.00   δ  -0.02 -1.05 0.30 
Ireland  α  -10.55 -2.85  0.00 USA  α  2.07 2.60 0.01 
  β  0.25 3.87 0.00   β  0.00 0.02 0.98 
  δ  0.08 2.42 0.02   δ  -0.04 -5.43 0.00 
Italy  α  7.67 6.65 0.00        
  β  -0.08 -2.16  0.03        
  δ  -0.08 -7.25  0.00        
Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced 
system, total observations: 798.   37
Table C2 – SUR estimation for the Cgroup26 panel (1970-2007) 
Country Coefficients 











Australia  α  -7.67 -9.59  0.00  Korea  α  14.10 3.86 0.00 
  β  0.12 2.02 0.04   β  0.13 0.48 0.63 
  δ  0.03 5.09 0.00   δ  -0.13 -4.26 0.00 
Austria  α  -24.23 -7.04  0.00 Luxembourg α  11.68 1.92 0.05 
  β  0.87 8.31 0.00   β  -0.50 -3.64 0.00 
  δ  0.26 7.16 0.00   δ  0.03 0.47 0.64 
Belgium  α  28.15 11.50  0.00 Mexico  α  -7.01 -3.31 0.00 
  β  0.28 7.31 0.00   β  -0.22 -3.20 0.00 
  δ  -0.23 -10.23  0.00   δ  0.05 2.31 0.02 
Canada  α  8.93 8.31 0.00 Netherlands  α  17.89 6.23 0.00 
  β  0.24 6.36 0.00   β  0.17 2.33 0.02 
  δ  -0.07 -8.35  0.00   δ  -0.12 -4.66 0.00 
Denmark  α  -28.29 -10.56  0.00 New  Zealand α  -2.91 -1.36 0.17 
  β  0.04 0.98 0.33   β  -0.45 -6.94 0.00 
  δ  0.28 10.36 0.00   δ  -0.02 -0.90 0.37 
Finland  α  28.63 12.30  0.00 Norway  α  24.13 2.36 0.02 
  β  -0.05 -0.67  0.51   β  0.69 7.35 0.00 
  δ  -0.23 -11.73  0.00   δ  -0.22 -2.34 0.02 
France  α  4.60 1.48 0.14 Portugal  α  21.97 6.39 0.00 
  β  -0.10 -1.32  0.19   β  0.32 2.63 0.01 
  δ  -0.05 -1.81  0.07   δ  -0.27 -7.80 0.00 
Germany  α  24.31 10.42  0.00 Spain  α  13.55 10.87 0.00 
  β  -0.01 -0.09  0.93   β  -0.77 -15.28 0.00 
  δ  -0.21 -9.77  0.00   δ  -0.18 -14.84 0.00 
Greece  α  27.96 7.84  0.00 Sweden  α  22.94 16.46 0.00 
  β  0.21 3.04 0.00   β  0.09 2.64 0.01 
  δ  -0.29 -9.07  0.00   δ  -0.18 -15.82 0.00 
Iceland  α  -12.25 -1.63  0.10 Switzerland  α  -4.66 -0.35 0.73 
  β  -1.06 -5.05  0.00   β  0.23 0.60 0.55 
  δ  0.06 0.78 0.43   δ  0.13 1.00 0.32 
Ireland  α  -11.15 -3.24  0.00 Turkey  α  1.90 0.61 0.54 
  β  0.27 4.52 0.00   β  -0.12 -1.74 0.08 
  δ  0.08 2.78 0.01   δ  -0.08 -2.40 0.02 
Italy  α  7.60 6.89 0.00 UK  α  0.35 0.24 0.81 
  β  -0.08 -2.25  0.02   β  -0.10 -2.21 0.03 
  δ  -0.08 -7.55  0.00   δ  -0.02 -1.53 0.13 
Japan  α  0.79 1.50 0.13 USA  α  1.53 2.02 0.04 
  β  -0.07 -2.05  0.04   β  0.01 0.32 0.75 
  δ  0.02 2.35 0.02   δ  -0.04 -4.89 0.00 
Note: Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Unbalanced 
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Appendix D – Sub-period analysis for the EU15 
We perform a similar panel data analysis for the EU15 panel as the one 
presented in the main text but here for two sub-periods, 1970-1989 and 1990-2007, in 
order to assess the relevance of possible different regimes notably in the run-up to the 
EMU.  
The results reported in the Table D1 show significant evidence in favour of the 
existence of a unit root in the current account balances, budget balances and effective 
real exchange rates series for the two sub-periods, which is in accordance with what we 
found for the full 1970-2007 period. Moreover, we are now able to put in evidence a 
significant cointegrating relationship between current account balances and budget 
balances for the sub-period 1990-2007 (See Table D1), which was not the case for the 
full sample (Table 2 in the main text).  Besides, we confirm for the two sub-periods the 
relevant role of the effective real exchange rates series in a long-run relationship 
between current account balances, budget balances and effective real exchange rates 
series (see Table D3).  
Finally, the SUR estimations of Tables D4.1 to D4.3 confirm the existence of 
different impacts of budget balances and effective real exchange rates on the current 
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Table D1 – Panel unit root test for current account balances, budget balances and 
effective real exchange rates 
 
















t   -2.654 0.059 - 1.841 0.778 -2.525  0.070 
LM   5.189 0.134 4.110 0.795 6.848  0.056 
max   -2.177 0.104 -1.742 0.405 -1.969  0.098 
min   4.913 0.086 4.062 0.318 4.849  0.123 
EU15 (1990-2007) 
t   -2.629        0.058        -2.405  0.164  -2.338  0.303 
LM   5.337 0.121 6.075 0.143 5.036  0.495 
max   -0.812 0.996 -2.025 0.088 -1.448  0.683 
min   2.185 0.976 4.945 0.084 3.544  0.559 
Notes: 
a) Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity at least in one country. All tests are based on an 
intercept and 5000 bootstrap replications to compute the p-values.  
# Results based on the test of Smith et al. (2004). 
 










Model with a constant term  7.085  0.000  0.000 
Model including a time trend  3.905  0.000  0.000 
EU15 (1990-2007)       
Model with a constant term  0.609  0.271   0.487 
Model including a time trend  4.217  0.000  0.007 
Notes: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between current account balances, 
budget balances and effective real exchange rates.  
# Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
 
Table D3 – Panel cointegration test results between current account balances, budget 









Model with a constant term  5.577  0.000  0.094 
Model including a time trend  26.06  0.00  0.00 
 
EU25 (1990-2007) 
    
Model with a constant term  5.640  0.000  0.822 
Model including a time trend  14.876  0.00  0.00 
Notes: the bootstrap is based on 2000 replications. 
a - The null hypothesis of the tests is cointegration between current account balances, 
budget balances and effective real exchange rates.  
# Test based on Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). 
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Table D4.1 – SUR estimation for the EU15 panel (1990-2007), budget balance and 
current account balance 
Country Coefficients 




Probability Country Coefficients 





Austria  α  3.17 6.02  0.00 Italy  α  -1.12 -2.81  0.01 
  β  1.04 9.10  0.00   β  -0.21 -6.74  0.00 
Belgium  α  3.90 19.04  0.00 Luxembourg  α  11.58 25.91  0.00 
  β  -0.12 -6.68  0.00    β  -0.11 -1.59  0.11 
Denmark  α  2.17 3.19  0.00 Netherlands  α  6.51 16.52  0.00 
  β  0.21 2.67  0.01   β  0.37 4.90  0.00 
Finland  α  1.83 6.86  0.00 Portugal  α  -12.53 -19.77  0.00 
  β  0.07 1.41  0.16   β  -1.20 -10.74  0.00 
France  α  4.79 5.83  0.00 Spain  α  -6.92 -24.52  0.00 
  β  0.20 2.59  0.01   β  -1.11 -31.55  0.00 
Germany  α  -0.54 -1.12  0.26  Sweden  α  4.50 7.09  0.00 
  β  -0.19 -2.12  0.04    β  0.13 3.15  0.00 
Greece  α  -13.61 -21.30  0.00  UK  α  -2.28 -9.22  0.00 
  β  -1.08 -17.04  0.00    β  -0.12 -3.23  0.00 
Ireland  α  -0.12 -0.23  0.82          
  β  -0.76 -12.06  0.00          
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced 
system, total observations: 270. 
 
 
Table D4.2 – SUR estimation for the EU15 panel (1970-1989), budget balance, current 
account balance, and effective real exchange rate 
Country Coefficients 











Austria  α  -1.68 -0.42  0.67  Italy  α  4.38 2.90 0.00 
  β  0.12 0.94 0.35    β  0.02 0.29 0.77 
  δ  0.01 0.12 0.90    δ  -0.05 -3.66 0.00 
Belgium  α  31.11 13.20  0.00  Luxembourg  α  29.10 4.28 0.00 
  β  0.33 7.19 0.00    β  -0.57 -3.26 0.00 
  δ  -0.26 -12.91  0.00    δ  -0.12 -1.89 0.06 
Denmark  α  -11.55 -3.23  0.00  Netherlands  α  21.95 5.95 0.00 
  β  0.06 1.03 0.31    β  -0.13 -1.29 0.20 
  δ  0.09 2.44 0.02    δ  -0.18 -5.46 0.00 
Finland  α  -7.66 -2.90  0.00  Portugal  α  28.14 3.60 0.00 
  β  -0.12 -1.09  0.28    β  0.35 2.01 0.05 
  δ  0.04 1.99 0.05    δ  -0.35 -3.98 0.00 
France  α  0.94 0.31 0.76  Spain  α  12.01 10.71 0.00 
  β  0.47 4.24 0.00    β  -0.43 -6.82 0.00 
  δ  -0.01 -0.54  0.59    δ  -0.15 -13.20 0.00 
Germany  α  16.39 5.52  0.00  Sweden  α  -4.34 -1.61 0.11 
  β  0.15 1.59 0.11    β  -0.09 -2.07 0.04 
  δ  -0.13 -4.89  0.00    δ  0.03 1.41 0.16 
Greece  α  8.31 2.37 0.02  UK  α  -2.48 -1.53 0.13 
  β  0.31 4.31 0.00    β  -0.26 -4.12 0.00 
  δ  -0.07 -2.19  0.03    δ  0.01 0.49 0.63 
Ireland  α  -57.00 -8.20  0.00         
  β  0.16 1.45 0.15         
  δ  0.50 7.77 0.00         
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced 
system, total observations: 300.   41
Table D4.3 – SUR estimation for the EU15 panel (1990-2007), budget balance, current 
account balance, and effective real exchange rate 
 
Country Coefficients 











Austria  α  3.28 0.24 0.81  Italy  α  14.20 9.86 0.00 
  β  1.25 6.91 0.00    β  -0.36 -8.55 0.00 
  δ  0.00 0.03 0.98    δ  -0.15 -10.70 0.00 
Belgium  α  16.71 5.07  0.00  Luxembourg  α  -12.50 -1.12  0.26 
  β  -0.19 -7.28  0.00    β  0.03 0.36 0.72 
  δ  -0.12 -3.92  0.00    δ  0.23 2.14 0.03 
Denmark  α  6.11 1.05 0.29  Netherlands  α  -12.51 -2.70  0.01 
  β  0.03 0.45 0.66    β  0.43 4.57 0.00 
  δ  -0.04 -0.74  0.46    δ  0.18 4.12 0.00 
Finland  α  30.20 21.92  0.00  Portugal  α  7.13 1.83 0.07 
  β  0.13 2.82 0.01    β  -0.96 -9.80 0.00 
  δ  -0.23 -19.08  0.00    δ  -0.18 -5.00 0.00 
France  α  0.23 0.06 0.95  Spain  α  2.47 1.25 0.21 
  β  -0.32 -3.90  0.00    β  -1.02 -17.05 0.00 
  δ  -0.01 -0.31  0.76    δ  -0.08 -4.74 0.00 
Germany  α  36.86 6.80  0.00  Sweden  α  27.94 21.27 0.00 
  β  0.02 0.30 0.77    β  0.03 1.02 0.31 
  δ  -0.33 -6.51  0.00    δ  -0.22 -18.21 0.00 
Greece  α  4.99 0.85 0.40  UK  α  13.27 8.29 0.00 
  β  -0.85 -8.59  0.00    β  0.14 3.76 0.00 
  δ  -0.16 -3.14  0.00    δ  -0.16  -9.78 0.00 
Ireland  α  25.03 14.73  0.00         
  β  -0.80 -13.36  0.00         
  δ  -0.22 -14.92  0.00         
Note:  Seemingly Unrelated Regression, linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix. Balanced 
system, total observations: 658. 
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